Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/100861 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2001
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2001-27
Verlag: 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Atlanta, GA
Zusammenfassung: 
The authors study the capital accumulation and welfare implications of ceilings on loan interest rates in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Binding ceilings on loan rates reduce the probability of bankruptcy. Lower bankruptcy rates result in lower bankruptcy and liquidation costs. The authors state conditions under which the resources freed by this cost-saving result increase the steady state capital stock, reduce steady state credit rationing, and raise the steady state welfare of all agents. The authors also argue that the conditions stated are likely to be satisfied in practice. Finally, their results hold even if initially there is capital over-accumulation.
Schlagwörter: 
Loans
Interest rates
Bankruptcy
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
348.04 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.