Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100076
Authors: 
Khadjavi, Menusch
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper 1938
Abstract: 
Criminal law and economics rests on the expectation that deterrence incentives can be employed to reduce crime. Prison survey evidence however suggests that a majority of criminals are biased and may not react to deterrence incentives. This study employs an extra-laboratory experiment in a German prison to test the effectiveness of deterrence. Subjects either face potential punishment when stealing, or they can steal without deterrence. We confirm Gary Becker's deterrence hypothesis that deterrence works for criminals.
Subjects: 
Crime
Stealing
Deterrence
Prison
Extra-laboratory experiment
Artefactual field experiment
JEL: 
C72
C91
C93
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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