Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/55866 
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper No. 1757
Publisher: 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel
Abstract: 
The effectiveness of NATO conditionality for institutional reforms is highly controversial. Some papers argue that any effect this conditionality might have had may be due to endogeneity effects, i.e. NATO may have picked the winners. We argue that this is not the case. First, NATO-Mazedonia relations provide a case in point. Macedonia was granted entry into the Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 1999 due to country's strategic importance. Only after the Ohrid agreement, effective conditionality set in and marked a switch in NATO strategy from security only towards institution building. Second, this is supported by econometric evidence based on panel data. An event study reveals that entry into NATO's accession process was mainly driven by neighbourhood and good relations with the West. We conclude that empirical evidence clearly supports a stronger role of NATO's political agenda, i.e., low entry barriers but strict accession conditionality.
Subjects: 
international organization
european integration
institutional development
accession incentives
regional security
JEL: 
F52
F53
F59
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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