Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/103981 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Kiel Working Paper No. 1971
Verlag: 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper proposes a simple framework to model social preferences in a game theoretic framework which explicitly separates economic incentives from social (context) effects. It is argued that such a perspective makes it easier to analyse contextual effects. Moreover, the framework is used to exemplify both theoretically and empirically how contextual variables such as social norms can worsen a social dilemma or possibly make it disappear. The empirical results of a randomised controlled classroom experiment show that women are more responsive to such contextual effects and that social agreements can also worsen economic inefficiencies.
Schlagwörter: 
Context Effects
Efficiency
Social Norms
Social Preferences
Utility
JEL: 
D03
D63
Z10
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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