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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 3 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2012 [Pages:] 119-137
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
Two deviations of alternating-offer bargaining behavior from economic theory are observed together, yet have been studied separately. Players who could secure themselves a large surplus share if bargainers were purely self-interested incompletely exploit their advantage. Delay in agreement occurs even if all experimentally controlled information is common knowledge. This paper rationalizes both regularities coherently by modeling heterogeneous social preferences, either self-interest or envy, of one bargaining party as private information in a three period game of bargaining and preference screening and signaling.
Schlagwörter: 
alternating-offer bargaining
asymmetric information
envy
fairness
inequality aversion
uncertainty
JEL: 
D03
D81
C73
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