Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/98490 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 1 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2010 [Pages:] 168-188
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
In this paper we want to shed some light on what we mean by backward induction and forward induction reasoning in dynamic games. To that purpose, we take the concepts of common belief in future rationality (Perea [1]) and extensive form rationalizability (Pearce [2], Battigalli [3], Battigalli and Siniscalchi [4]) as possible representatives for backward induction and forward induction reasoning. We compare both concepts on a conceptual, epistemic and an algorithm level, thereby highlighting some of the crucial differences between backward and forward induction reasoning in dynamic games.
Subjects: 
epistemic game theory
backward induction
forward induction
algorithms
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
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