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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
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[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 1 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2010 [Pages:] 168-188
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we want to shed some light on what we mean by backward induction and forward induction reasoning in dynamic games. To that purpose, we take the concepts of common belief in future rationality (Perea [1]) and extensive form rationalizability (Pearce [2], Battigalli [3], Battigalli and Siniscalchi [4]) as possible representatives for backward induction and forward induction reasoning. We compare both concepts on a conceptual, epistemic and an algorithm level, thereby highlighting some of the crucial differences between backward and forward induction reasoning in dynamic games.
Schlagwörter: 
epistemic game theory
backward induction
forward induction
algorithms
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