Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96897
Authors: 
Buechel, Berno
Mühlheusser, Gerd
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4698
Abstract: 
An authority delegates a monitoring task to an agent. It can only observe the number of detected offenders, but neither the monitoring intensity chosen by the agent nor the resulting level of misbehavior. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the implementability of monitoring policies. Typically, several monitoring intensities give rise to the same number of detected offenses, and only the minimum of these can be implemented. In equilibrium, a large fraction of potential offenders cannot be deterred.
Subjects: 
monitoring
deterrence
unobservable misbehavior
victimless crime
doping
law & economics
JEL: 
K42
D73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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