Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96487
Authors: 
Liu, Xin
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Discussion Papers 2014-19
Abstract: 
This paper analyses a game theoretic model of tax competition in a system where tax authorities are revenue optimisers and countries are differentiated by size. The model accommodates more than two countries. In equilibrium, larger countries set higher tax rates non-cooperatively. By applying the Hotelling linear model, this paper gives examples where the size effect, neighbourhood effect, and peripheral effect coexist and push up the tax rate in equilibrium.
Subjects: 
tax competition
cross-border shopping
Nash equilibrium
peripheral effects
JEL: 
H20
H71
H73
R51
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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