Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94032
Authors: 
Feidler, Janos
Staal, Klaas
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 241
Abstract: 
We model the trade-off between centralized and decentralized decision making over the provision of local public goods. Centralized decisions are made in a legislature of locally elected representatives, and this creates a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions. The legislature can be self-interested or benevolent and this can result in either efficient, excessive or misallocative provision of public goods. Decisions are inuenced by spillover effects and differences in jurisdictionalsize. Furthermore, we look at the incentives for centralization.
Subjects: 
decentralization
local public goods
JEL: 
H40
H70
P51
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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