Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/94032 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 241
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
We model the trade-off between centralized and decentralized decision making over the provision of local public goods. Centralized decisions are made in a legislature of locally elected representatives, and this creates a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions. The legislature can be self-interested or benevolent and this can result in either efficient, excessive or misallocative provision of public goods. Decisions are inuenced by spillover effects and differences in jurisdictionalsize. Furthermore, we look at the incentives for centralization.
Schlagwörter: 
decentralization
local public goods
JEL: 
H40
H70
P51
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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