Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94025
Authors: 
Schweinzer, Paul
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 136
Abstract: 
We study the alternating-offer bargaining problem of sharing a common value pie under incomplete information on both sides and no depreciation between two identical players. We characterise the essentially unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game which turns out to be in gradually increasing offers.
Subjects: 
Gradual bargaining
Common values
Incomplete information
Repeated games
JEL: 
C73
C78
D44
D82
J12
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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