Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/93896 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 291
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that combines a license auction with royalty contracts to those who lose the auction. Firms' bids are dual signals of their cost reductions: the winning bid signals the own cost reduction to rival oligopolists, whereas the losing bid influences the beliefs of the innovator who uses that information to set the royalty rate. We derive conditions for existence of a separating equilibrium, explain why a sufficiently high reserve price is essential for such an equilibrium, and show that the innovator generally benefits from the proposed mechanism.
Schlagwörter: 
Patents
licensing
auctions
royalty
innovation
R&D
mechanism design
JEL: 
D21
D43
D44
D45
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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