Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93833
Authors: 
Schmidt, Robert C.
Strausz, Roland
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 366
Abstract: 
We study the potential of cooperation in global emission abatements with multiple externalities. Using a two-country model without side-payments, we identify the strategic effects under different timing regimes of cooperation. We obtain a positive complementarity effect of long-term cooperation in abatement on R&D levels that boosts potential bene?t of long-term cooperation and a redistributive effect that destabilizes long-term cooperation when countries are asymmetric. We show that whether and what type of cooperation is sustainable, depends crucially on the kind rather than on the magnitude of asymmetries.
Subjects: 
climate treaty
timing of cooperation
multiple externalities
long-term commitment
JEL: 
D62
F53
H23
Q55
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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