Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/93833 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 366
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the potential of cooperation in global emission abatements with multiple externalities. Using a two-country model without side-payments, we identify the strategic effects under different timing regimes of cooperation. We obtain a positive complementarity effect of long-term cooperation in abatement on R&D levels that boosts potential bene?t of long-term cooperation and a redistributive effect that destabilizes long-term cooperation when countries are asymmetric. We show that whether and what type of cooperation is sustainable, depends crucially on the kind rather than on the magnitude of asymmetries.
Schlagwörter: 
climate treaty
timing of cooperation
multiple externalities
long-term commitment
JEL: 
D62
F53
H23
Q55
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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