Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92882
Authors: 
Tamura, Wataru
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 828
The ISER-Moriguchi Prize Awarded Paper 14
Abstract: 
We study disclosure of information about the multidimensional state of the world when uninformed receivers' actions affect the sender's utility. Given a disclosure rule, the receivers form an expectation about the state following each message. Under the assumption that the sender's expected utility is written as the expected value of a quadratic function of those conditional expectations, we identify conditions under which full and no disclosure is optimal for the sender and show that a linear transformation of the state is optimal if it is normally distributed. We apply our theory to advertising, political campaigning, and monetary policy.
Subjects: 
information disclosure
semidefinite programming
linear transformation
JEL: 
D83
L15
M37
D72
E52
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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