Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92875
Authors: 
Akai, Kenju
Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 740
Abstract: 
This paper reports the theoretical and experimental results of auctions for public construction in which firms cut corners. We show that winning bids and qualities of the constructed buildings are both zero in equilibria if there are at least two firms whose initial cash balances are zero. The experimental results support that firms with zeroinitial cash balance win and that the winning bids and the qualities of the constructed buildings are considerably low.
Subjects: 
Corner-cutting
Public procurement
First-price auction
Experiment
JEL: 
C92
D44
L15
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
249.89 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.