Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92875 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 740
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper reports the theoretical and experimental results of auctions for public construction in which firms cut corners. We show that winning bids and qualities of the constructed buildings are both zero in equilibria if there are at least two firms whose initial cash balances are zero. The experimental results support that firms with zeroinitial cash balance win and that the winning bids and the qualities of the constructed buildings are considerably low.
Schlagwörter: 
Corner-cutting
Public procurement
First-price auction
Experiment
JEL: 
C92
D44
L15
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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