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Autoren: 
Aoyagi, Masaki
Datum: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 832
Zusammenfassung: 
A principal acquires information about a shock and then discloses it to an agent. After the disclosure, the principal and agent each decide whether to take costly preparatory actions that yield benefits only when the shock strikes. The principal maximizes his expected payoff by controlling the quality of his information, and the disclosure rule. We show that even when the acquisition of perfect information is costless, the principal may optimally acquire imperfect information when his own action eliminates the agent's incentive to take action against the risk.
Schlagwörter: 
endogenous information
disclosure
signal quality
transparency
specific investment
strategic ignorance
JEL: 
C72
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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