Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92679
Authors: 
Matsumura, Toshihiro
Matsushima, Noriaki
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 810
Abstract: 
We examine how vertical separation affects the lobbying activities for the access charge of essential facilities. First, when investigating a model where the number of new entrants is fixed, we find that vertical separation either increases or decreases the access charge, and that this depends on the relative efficiency between the incumbent and the new entrants, and the number of entrants. Second, when investigating a freeentry market, we find that vertical separation always reduces the access charge in such a market. The vertically integrated firm has a stronger incentive to lobby in this market because a higher access charge reduces the number of competitors.
Subjects: 
network industry
access charge
manipulation of accounting
regulation
JEL: 
L51
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
216.67 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.