Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92679 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 810
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine how vertical separation affects the lobbying activities for the access charge of essential facilities. First, when investigating a model where the number of new entrants is fixed, we find that vertical separation either increases or decreases the access charge, and that this depends on the relative efficiency between the incumbent and the new entrants, and the number of entrants. Second, when investigating a freeentry market, we find that vertical separation always reduces the access charge in such a market. The vertically integrated firm has a stronger incentive to lobby in this market because a higher access charge reduces the number of competitors.
Schlagwörter: 
network industry
access charge
manipulation of accounting
regulation
JEL: 
L51
L13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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