Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92628
Authors: 
Fujinaka, Yuji
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 721
Abstract: 
We consider the problem of fairly allocating one indivisible object when monetary transfers are possible, and examine the existence of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms to solve the problem. We propose a mechanism that satisfies envy-freeness, budget balancedness, and Bayesian incentive compatibility. Further, we establish the uniqueness of the mechanism under an order additivity condition. This result contrasts well with various results on the incompatibility between efficiency and ex post incentive compatibility.
Subjects: 
Bayesian incentive compatibility
Fair division
Indivisible good
Mechanism design
JEL: 
C72
C78
D61
D63
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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