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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 721
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider the problem of fairly allocating one indivisible object when monetary transfers are possible, and examine the existence of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms to solve the problem. We propose a mechanism that satisfies envy-freeness, budget balancedness, and Bayesian incentive compatibility. Further, we establish the uniqueness of the mechanism under an order additivity condition. This result contrasts well with various results on the incompatibility between efficiency and ex post incentive compatibility.
Schlagwörter: 
Bayesian incentive compatibility
Fair division
Indivisible good
Mechanism design
JEL: 
C72
C78
D61
D63
D71
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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