Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89683
Authors: 
Scharf, Kimberley Ann
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4479
Abstract: 
We show that warm-glow motives in provision by competing suppliers can lead to inefficient charity selection. In these situations, discretionary donor choices can promote efficient charity selection even when provision outcomes are non-verifiable. Government funding arrangements, on the other hand, face verification constraints that make them less flexible relative to private donations. Switching from direct grants to government subsidies for private donations can thus produce a positive pro-competitive effect on charity selection, raising the value of charity provision per dollar of funding.
Subjects: 
private provision of public goods
warm glow
tax incentives for giving
competition in the nonprofit sector
JEL: 
H20
H30
H40
L30
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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