Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89397
Authors: 
Amendola, Gennaro
Settepanella, Simona
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
LEM Working Paper Series 2010/05
Abstract: 
Marengo and the second author have developed in the last years a geometric model of social choice when this takes place among bundles of interdependent elements, showing that by bundling and unbundling the same set of constituent elements an authority has the power of determining the social outcome. In this paper we will tie the model above to tournament theory, solving some of the mathematical problems arising in their work and opening new questions which are interesting not only from a mathematical and a social choice point of view, but also from an economic and a genetic one. In particular, we will introduce the notion of u-local optima and we will study it from both a theoretical and a numerical/probabilistic point of view; we will also describe an algorithm that computes the universal basin of attraction of a social outcome in O(M3 log M) time (where M is the number of social outcomes).
Subjects: 
social rule
modularity
object
optimum
hyperplane arrangement
tournament
algorithm
JEL: 
D03
D71
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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