Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/88117
Authors: 
Heinemann, Friedrich
Janeba, Eckhard
Moessinger, Marc-Daniel
Schröder, Christoph
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers 13-090
Abstract: 
Fiscal federalism in Germany is characterized by lacking sub-national tax autonomy and intensive fiscal equalization. Due to a sunset clause, the current equalization system has to be renegotiated by the year 2019. Against this backdrop, this contribution studies the reform preferences of members of state parliaments. The study makes use of a self-conducted survey among the members of all 16 German state parliaments. It tests to which extent the preferences of these veto players for tax autonomy and fiscal equalization are driven by states' self-interest, party ideology and individual characteristics. The results are helpful to understand the political-economic constraints of federal reforms. They indicate that besides the individual ideological position higher state wealth and lower debt levels are linked to larger reform support. Therefore, a promising new reform would have to address budgetary legacies like high pre-existing debt.
Subjects: 
fiscal equalization
tax competition
fiscal federalism
JEL: 
H63
H74
H77
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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