Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87289
Authors: 
van der Laan, Gerard
Moes, Nigel
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 12-006/1
Abstract: 
In this paper we study international river pollution problems. We introduce a model in which the agents (countries) located along a river derive benefit while causing pollution, but also incur environmental costs of experiencing pollution from all upstream agents. We find that total pollution in the model decreases when the agents decide to cooperate. The resulting gain in social welfare can be distributed among the agents based on the property rights over the river. Using principles from international water law we suggest 'fair' ways of distributing the property rights and therefore the cooperative gain.
Subjects: 
international river
pollution
externality
property rights
value
JEL: 
C70
D60
Q53
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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