Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86320
Authors: 
Pruzhansky, Vitaly
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 04-028/1
Abstract: 
This paper builds on one of the results of Pruzhansky [22], namely that maximin strategies guarantee the same expected payoffs as mixed Nash equilibrium strategies in bimatrix games. We present a discussion on the applicability of maximin strategies in such class of games. The usefulness of maximin is illustrated from both positive and normative viewpoints. Examples are provided.
Subjects: 
Bounded rationality
common knowledge of rationality
correlated equilibria
rationalizability
uncertainty aversion
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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