Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86101
Authors: 
van den Brink, René
Gilles, Robert P.
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 03-102/1
Abstract: 
In this paper we consider the problem of the control of access to a firm's productive asset, embedding the relevant decisionmakers into a general structure of formal authority relations. Within such an authority structure, each decision maker acts as a principal to some decision makers, while she acts as an agent in relation to certain other decision makers. We study under which conditions decision makers decide to exercise their own authority and to accept their superiors' authority.We distinguish two types of behavior within such an authority situation. First, we investigate a non-cooperative equilibrium concept describing the explicit, myopic exercise of authority. We find that if monitoring costs are sufficiently small, such explicit authority is exercised fully.Second, we consider the possibility of subordinates to submit themselves to authority even though such authority is not enforced explicitly. Again for sufficiently small monitoring costs such latent authority can be supported as an equilibrium.
Subjects: 
Cooperative games
Hierarchies
Social situations
Authority
JEL: 
C71
C79
D23
L23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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