Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/85852 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 03-055/1
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
In many business transactions, in labor-management relations, in internationalconflicts, and welfare state reforms bargainers hold strong entitlements that are oftengenerated by claims that are not feasible any more. These entitlements seem to considerablyshape negotiation behavior. By using the novel setup of a 'bargaining with claims' experimentwe provide new systematic evidence tracking the influence of entitlements and obligationsthrough the whole bargaining process. We find strong entitlement effects that shape openingoffers, bargaining duration, concessions and reached (dis-)agreements. We argue thatentitlements constitute a 'moral property right' that is influential independent ofnegotiators' legal property rights.
Schlagwörter: 
Moral property rights
fairness judgments
bargaining with claims
self-serving bias
JEL: 
A12
D63
C78
C92
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
337.6 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.