Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/84165
Authors: 
Feld, Lars P.
Schnellenbach, Jan
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4382
Abstract: 
We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-) distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1981 and 1998. The evidence indicates that presidential regimes are associated with a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, while electoral systems have no significant effects. Fiscal competition is associated with less income redistribution and a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, but also with a more equal primary income distribution. Our evidence also is in line with earlier empirical contributions that find a positive relationship between trade openness and equality in primary and disposable incomes, as well as the overall redistributive effort.
Subjects: 
redistribution
formal institutions
fiscal decentralization
presidential and parliamentary regimes
electoral systems
JEL: 
D31
H22
H11
H50
I38
P50
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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