Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/82935 
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 1999:3
Publisher: 
Uppsala University, Department of Economics, Uppsala
Abstract: 
The empirical evidence suggests that parents use inter vivos gifts (i.e., transfers of tangible and financial property) to compensate less well off children whereas post mortem bequests are divided equally among siblings. We study a theoretical model assuming, first, that the amounts given is private information, only known to the donor and the donee, while the amounts bequeathed is public information. Second, we assume that parents care about the reputation that their bequest behavior will leave them after their death. More specifically, this reputation is deteriorating in the difference in amounts inherited. We show that, given optimal choice of altruistic parents is compensatory gifts and equal bequests.
Subjects: 
altruism
bequests
inheritances
gifts
equal division
post mortem reputation
social norm
information
JEL: 
D10
D31
D63
D64
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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