Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/82935 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1999
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 1999:3
Verlag: 
Uppsala University, Department of Economics, Uppsala
Zusammenfassung: 
The empirical evidence suggests that parents use inter vivos gifts (i.e., transfers of tangible and financial property) to compensate less well off children whereas post mortem bequests are divided equally among siblings. We study a theoretical model assuming, first, that the amounts given is private information, only known to the donor and the donee, while the amounts bequeathed is public information. Second, we assume that parents care about the reputation that their bequest behavior will leave them after their death. More specifically, this reputation is deteriorating in the difference in amounts inherited. We show that, given optimal choice of altruistic parents is compensatory gifts and equal bequests.
Schlagwörter: 
altruism
bequests
inheritances
gifts
equal division
post mortem reputation
social norm
information
JEL: 
D10
D31
D63
D64
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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