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Erscheinungsjahr: 
1998
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 1998:2
Verlag: 
Uppsala University, Department of Economics, Uppsala
Zusammenfassung: 
Should unemployment compensation be paid indefinitely at a fixed rate or should it decline (or increase) over a worker’s unemployment spell? We examine these issues using an equilibrium model of search unemployment. The model features worker-firm bargaining over wages, free entry of new jobs, and endogenous search effort among the unemployed. The main result is that an optimal insurance program implies a declining sequence of unemployment compensation over the spell of unemployment. Numerical calibrations of the model suggest that there are non-trivial welfare gains associated with switching from an optimal uniform benefit structure to an optimally differentiated system.
Schlagwörter: 
Job search
Unemployment
Unemployment insurance
JEL: 
D83
H21
J65
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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