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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2003:22
Verlag: 
Uppsala University, Department of Economics, Uppsala
Zusammenfassung: 
While examining the macroeconomic effects of government tax and punishment policies, this paper develops a three-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargaining. Workers are assumed to differ in ability, and the choice of education is determined endogenously. Job opportunities in an informal sector are available only to workers who choose not to acquire higher education. We find that increased punishment of informal activities increases the number of educated workers and reduces the number of unemployed workers. The analysis also shows that knowledge spillovers give a welfare maximizing government an extra incentive to punish informal activities.
Schlagwörter: 
Tax evasion
underground economy
education
matching
unemployment
JEL: 
H26
I21
J64
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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