Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81868
Authors: 
Claeys, Sophie
Schoors, Koen
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series 205
Abstract: 
Supervisors sometimes have to manage both the micro- and macro- prudential dimensions of bank stability. These may either conflict or complement each other. We analyze prudential supervision by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR). We find evidence of micro-prudential concerns, measured as the rule-based enforcement of bank standards. Macro-prudential concerns are also documented: Banks in concentrated bank markets, large banks, money center banks and large deposit banks are less likely to face license withdrawal. Further, the CBR is reluctant to withdraw licenses when there are 'too many banks to fail'. Finally, macro-prudential concerns induce regulatory forbearance, revealing conflicts with micro-prudential objectives.
Subjects: 
prudential supervision
bank stability
systemic stability
JEL: 
G2
N2
E5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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