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Brangewitz, Sonja
Gamp, Jan-Philip
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Institute of Mathematical Economics 449
We consider the inner core as a solution concept for cooperative games with non- transferable utility (NTU) and its relationship to competitive equilibria of markets that are induced by an NTU game. We investigate the relationship between certain subsets of the inner core for NTU market games and competitive payoff vectors of markets linked to the NTU market game. This can be considered as the case in between the two extreme cases of Qin (1993). We extend the results of Qin (1993) to a large class of closed subsets of the inner core: Given an NTU market game we construct a market depending on a given closed subset of its inner core. This market represents the game and further has the given set as the set of payoffs of competitive equilibria. It turns out that this market is not determined uniquely and thus we obtain a class of markets with the desired property.
Market Games
Competitive Payoffs
Inner Core
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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