Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/81109 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Papers No. 449
Verlag: 
Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider the inner core as a solution concept for cooperative games with non- transferable utility (NTU) and its relationship to competitive equilibria of markets that are induced by an NTU game. We investigate the relationship between certain subsets of the inner core for NTU market games and competitive payoff vectors of markets linked to the NTU market game. This can be considered as the case in between the two extreme cases of Qin (1993). We extend the results of Qin (1993) to a large class of closed subsets of the inner core: Given an NTU market game we construct a market depending on a given closed subset of its inner core. This market represents the game and further has the given set as the set of payoffs of competitive equilibria. It turns out that this market is not determined uniquely and thus we obtain a class of markets with the desired property.
Schlagwörter: 
Market Games
Competitive Payoffs
Inner Core
JEL: 
C71
D51
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
398.91 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.