Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80963
Authors: 
Kebede, Bereket
Tarazona, Marcela
Munro, Alistair
Verschoor, Arjan
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
WIDER Working Paper 2013/012
Abstract: 
An experimental design using treatments of a voluntary contribution mechanism is used to test household efficiency. Efficiency is decisively rejected in all treatments contrary to the assumption of most household models. Information on initial endowments of spouses improves efficiency only in some treatments suggesting that the impact of information is context dependent. Actual and expected contribution rates of spouses are systematically different; husbands' (wives') expectations of their wives' (husbands') contributions are higher (lower) than actual contributions. These errors imply that equilibrium in a game theoretic framework is unlikely. Statistical tests indicate other considerations than efficiency are likely important.
Subjects: 
household efficiency
intra-household models
experimental games
Ethiopia
JEL: 
D13
C93
D03
ISBN: 
978-92-9230-589-5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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