Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80497
Authors: 
Alstadsæter, Annette
Jacob, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4369
Abstract: 
We examine the role of tax incentives, tax awareness, and complexity in tax evasion. We observe a specific type of tax evasion among business owners in Swedish administrative panel data, after the tax authority has approved all tax returns. For the period 2006–2009, approximately 5% of tax returns overstate a claimed dividend allowance. Tax awareness decreases and complexity increases the likelihood of misreporting. Our results indicate that some observed misreporting could be accidental, while some misreporting is deliberate tax evasion. We identify a positive and significant effect of tax rates on tax evasion, by exploiting a large kink in the tax schedule. The majority of misreporting cases remains undetected by the tax authority. Self-correction of tax evasion by taxpayers is the dominant type of detection.
Subjects: 
tax evasion
tax compliance
tax enforcement
tax awareness
detection
JEL: 
H26
H24
D14
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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