Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/80230 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2002-21
Verlag: 
Brown University, Department of Economics, Providence, RI
Zusammenfassung: 
While there is an extensive literature on the theory of in finitely repeated games, empirical evidence on how “the shadow of the future” affects behavior is scarce and inconclusive. We simulate in finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games in the lab by having a random continuation rule. The experimental design represents an improvement over the existing literature by including sessions with finite repeated games as controls and a large number of players per session (which allows for learning without contagion effects). We find strong evidence that the higher the probability of continuation, the higher the levels of cooperation. We compare the behavior from these in finitely repeated games with behavior from finitely repeated games of the same expected length and we find that there is more cooperation in the in finitely repeated games. Finally, we consider different payoffs matrices that result in different equilibrium outcomes for some probabilities of continuation, and find that the set of observed outcomes closely follows the set of equilibrium outcomes.
Schlagwörter: 
in finitely repeated games
prisoner’s dilemma
cooperation
experimental economics
JEL: 
C72
C73
C91
C92
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
179.6 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.