Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80217
Authors: 
Serrano, Roberto
Vohra, Rajiv
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2001-24
Abstract: 
We provide a mechanism that approximately implements the Mas-Colell bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism is based on the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium.
Subjects: 
Mas-Colell bargaining set
implementation
approximate implementation
subgame perfect equilibrium
JEL: 
C71
C72
C78
D51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
127.67 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.