Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80191
Authors: 
Bisin, A
Geanakoplos J. D.
Gottardi P.
Minelli E.
Polemarchakis H.
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2001-36
Abstract: 
Economies with asymmetric information are encompassed by an extension of the model of general competitive equilibrium that does not require an explicit modeling of private information. Sellers have discretion over deliveries on contracts; this is in common with economies with default, incomplete contracts or price rigidities. Competitive, anonymous markets are viable. For a generic economy, there exist a Pareto improving intervention via linear, anonymous taxes.
Subjects: 
asymmetric information
competitive markets
equilibrium
JEL: 
D50
D52
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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