Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/80122 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2005-05
Verlag: 
Brown University, Department of Economics, Providence, RI
Zusammenfassung: 
When subjects can make non-binding announcements of possible contributions to a public good numerically, there is no effect on average level of contributions in a public goods experiment relative to play without announcements. But a detailed analysis of this experiment shows that pre-play announcements increased the variance of achieved cooperation among groups, leading both to more highly cooperative groups and to more thoroughly uncooperative groups than in a treatment without announcements. We also add a treatment in which subjects can select a statement of (non-binding) “promise” to contribute a certain amount and we find that even though subjects were instructed that promise statements were not binding, the ability to issue them significantly increased both contributions and earnings in a treatment that includes costly punishment opportunities, although not in a treatment without punishment.
Schlagwörter: 
Public goods
collective action
communication
punishment
cheap talk
JEL: 
C91
H41
D23
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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