Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79975
Authors: 
Irlenbusch, Bernd
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike
Rilke, Rainer
Walkowitz, Gari
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Values, Virtues and Equity in Experiments C05-V3
Abstract: 
We experimentally investigate the relevance of (asymmetric) outside options in ultimatum bargaining. Building on the generalized equity principle formulated by Selten (1978) we derive three di erent equity rules. These equity rules can explain 43% of all o ers. Our within-subject design allows us to show that proposers apply the equity rules in a self-serving manner, i.e., proposers tend to follow the rules that suggest the highest payo for them. This tendency leads to high ine ciencies due to frequent rejections.
JEL: 
C78
C91
D63
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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