Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79963
Authors: 
Zulehner, Christine
Elsinger, Helmut
Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Issues in Auctions A16-V3
Abstract: 
We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. EU accession by Austria provides a natural experiment causing an exogenous increase in the number of bidders in Treasury Auctions. Difference-in-difference estimates suggest that the increased number in bidders caused a significant drop in the yields Austria had to pay for newly issued debt. We use structural estimates of bidders private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction revenue. We compare bidder surplus before and after the auction. We find a small effect on the the surplus earned by bidders as a result of increased competition.
JEL: 
D44
L13
G12
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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