Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79737
Authors: 
Stähler, Frank
Maskus, Keith
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Trade Policy B08-V1
Abstract: 
Legalized parallel trade implies that an original manufacturer cannot control a retailer in a foreign country once the latter has ordered its sales quantity and has compensated the former. This paper endogenizes the role of the retailer as an agent who has private information on the perceived quality of the good in the foreign country. Paradoxically, if parallel trade is permitted there will be no such trade in the only equilibrium, in which the manufacturer offers a smaller volume to the retailer than in the case where it is not permitted. This outcome makes both the original producer and foreign consumers worse off.
JEL: 
F13
F15
F12
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.