Stähler, Frank; Maskus, Keith

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Retailers as Agents and the Absence of Parallel Trade\textsuperscript{1}

Keith Maskus\textsuperscript{2}
Department of Economics
University of Colorado

Frank Stähler\textsuperscript{3}
Department of Economics
University of Tübingen

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\textsuperscript{2}Boulder, CO 80309, USA, email: Keith.Maskus@colorado.edu

\textsuperscript{3}Corresponding author, Mohlstr. 36 (V4), D-72074 Tübingen, Germany, email: frank.staehler@uni-tuebingen.de
Abstract

The volume of retail-level parallel trade is surprisingly small, given the presence of persistent international price differences. We offer an agency-based explanation. Legalized parallel trade implies that an original manufacturer cannot control a retailer in a foreign country once the latter has ordered its sales quantity and has compensated the former. This paper endogenizes the role of the retailer as an agent who has private information on the perceived quality of the good in the foreign country. Paradoxically, if parallel trade is permitted there will be no such trade in the only equilibrium, in which the manufacturer offers a smaller volume to the retailer than in the case where it is not permitted. This outcome makes both the original producer and foreign consumers worse off.

JEL-Classification: F13, F15.

Keywords: Parallel trade, trade cost, incomplete information.
1 Introduction

Parallel trade (PT) occurs where a product is legitimately sold in one market but then legally imported into a second market without the authorization of the firm owning distribution rights there. These rights to control distribution arise from the exercise of intellectual property rights (IPR – patents, copyrights and trademarks) owned by the original manufacturer of the good. A central feature determining the scope of IPR is each country’s exhaustion doctrine, defining the point at which distribution rights end. For example, if a country has a policy of international exhaustion then first sale of the good anywhere in the world ends the rights to control further distribution. Thus, a retailer or distributor in any other country may legally resell the goods there because the IPR owner is not permitted to exclude such products sold in this parallel distribution channel. It is quite possible for this process to incorporate both controlled exports from the IPR owner in one nation to an independent retailer in another and uncontrolled exports from that retailer to consumers in the originating nation. This is the case we consider in this paper.

It is evident that parallel trade, by offering competition outside authorized distribution chains, is likely to reduce profits of the original manufacturers. Thus, they might prefer outright legal restrictions against PT, which is largely the policy of national exhaustion in the United States. Similarly, the European Union bars parallel imports from outside its region. However, the EU has long regarded the possibility of within-region PT to be a key means of ensuring that the internal market is fully integrated. Thus, through provisions of the EC Treaty and various findings in case law, EU policy rigorously supports the concept of regional exhaustion, or unimpeded PT among member states.\(^1\) As a consequence, one might expect there to be substantial volumes of PT conducted by retailers, which in turn should narrow consumer price differences among EU countries. Unfortunately, authorities do not collect information on the amounts of PT since it is legal and therefore there is no policy-based need to distinguish it from authorized imports.

\(^1\)Ganslandt and Maskus [4] overview the particulars of this policy.
However, anecdotal and survey evidence suggests three important stylized facts. First, parallel trade is small in relation to overall trade flows. Second, the vast bulk of the PT that exists occurs at the wholesale distributor level, not at retail (National Economic Research Associates [11]). For example, goods that see notable volumes of PT, such as bulk syrup for soft drinks, cosmetics, automobiles, electronics, and pharmaceuticals, are exchanged primarily at the wholesale level. Third, there appears to be considerably less price convergence than might be anticipated in a regime of free arbitrage. A good example is that, despite the increase in imported prescription medicines via parallel channels in Sweden after that country joined the EU in 1995, there was little detectable reduction in retail price differences between importing and exporting locations (Ganslandt and Maskus [3]). Even for products that are not subject to national price controls, large variations in retail prices persist (European Central Bank [2]). Thus, the stylized facts we wish to explain here are the near absence of retail-level PT and the stubborn persistence of significant retail price variations across EC members.

The EU’s enthusiasm for parallel trade presumes the existence of highly competitive markets at all distribution levels, which would support arbitrage against price differences. The reality that PT is limited could reflect an alternative – and more likely – factor, that distribution markets are subject to imperfect competition. Specifically, IPR owners have substantial market power in their own goods and may be expected to act strategically to limit the profit-reducing impacts of PT. Indeed, there are realistic circumstances under which the behavior of such firms would deter such trade altogether even though it is perfectly legal. Put differently, allowing PT does not mean that it will in fact occur as IPR holders react to counter retailers’ incentives for cross-border arbitrage. The idea that strategic responses can deter PT over a range of trade costs was first noted in the seminal papers setting out models of distribution with vertical price control (VPC – see Maskus and Chen [10], Chen and Maskus [1]). In those models, the manufacturer sets a two-part tariff (a wholesale price and a fixed fee) and will deliver any quantity the foreign distributor demands at this wholesale price. The originator firm uses such contracts to balance its interests in reducing PT and mitigat-
ing the double-marginalization effect in the target markets. Note that the assumption of perfectly elastic wholesale supplies sits awkwardly with evidence that firms in the EU try to limit quantities to distributors (Ganslandt and Maskus [5]). The VPC approach also assumes complete information, in that all players are fully aware of demand and cost conditions in all markets. Further, it treats distributors and retailers as passive players and offers limited conceptual backing for why independent retailers exist in the first place.

Our interest here is to overcome some of these obvious shortcomings in a model that does not rely on vertical control and perfect information. Rather, we explore the situation in which an original manufacturer has no control whatsoever over the independent foreign retailer once the two have reached an agreement on volume. In the model, the manufacturer specifies a quantity and the retailer is free to do with that volume whatever it wants, including re-exporting back to the original firm’s market. Indeed, this situation is pro-competitive in the extreme in that a wholesaler cannot assert discipline over the retailer once the original deal has been made.

Accordingly, the model has three key features, all of them novel to the PT literature. First, payment made for the contractual quantity offered to the retailer is treated as a sunk cost by the retailer in the competitive stage of the game. Thus, that firm decides how to serve the home and foreign markets without taking into account its production cost (the wholesale price). Second, we endogenize the role of the retailer: the manufacturer hires the retailer because it has better (private) information about demand in his market than the manufacturer. Thus, the retailer is no longer a passive participant as in VPC models. The information asymmetry makes the retailer more efficient in its market but it may also use this information to extract a rent. Third, we extend the model to allow the IPR owner to establish a wholly owned retail subsidiary, which may resolve the information problem, and explore how this option changes the originator’s behavior.

This is the first paper to study parallel trade in a principal-agent model which endogenizes the existence of the retailer. Most of the literature, including both those involving simple retail arbitrage (e.g., Richardson [13]) and
the VPC model (Maskus and Chen [10], Chen and Maskus [1]) has set out a
to the case of two target markets of the IPR owner and studied the effects of
a competition-policy rule requiring the firm to set a uniform wholesale price
to both distributors. Related models have incorporated differences in product
quality (Valetti and Szymanski [15]), R&D investments in cost reductions (Li
and Maskus [9], Li [8]), and the effects of parallel trade and price controls
on innovation (Grossman and Lai [6]). However, a central feature of all these
models is that the manufacturer exercises vertical control over the retailer,
which itself is passive.

Our paper is perhaps closest to Raff and Schmitt [12] who demonstrate
that parallel trade may even improve the original firm’s profit if demand is
uncertain. As in our model, they assume that retailers decide on sales after
they have ordered their best quantities and have paid the originator. Hence,
the payment is sunk when the retailer decides on sales in different markets.
However, the retail industry in Raff and Schmitt [12] is perfectly competitive
and there is no asymmetric information. Our setup assumes just one retailer
with better information about the market potential of the good produced by
the manufacturer.

We regard our analysis as complementary to the existing literature by
analyzing the case where vertical control cannot be exercised, thereby bring-
ing the retailer actively into the game. Note that this is not a matter of
formal control. It does not matter whether the transfer to the original man-
ufacturer is done via a lump-sum payment or via a variable wholesale price.
What matters is whether this payment still plays a role when the retailer
decides on sales in various countries. If it does not then vertical control is
lost at this competition stage. There is some empirical evidence supporting
our approach. Sauer [14] finds no support for vertical price control in general
for parallel trade, except for high-priced exporters and low-priced importers,
though it must be noted that the test she employed was indirect.

Our primary results are as follows. First, in the absence of vertical con-
trol prices are likely to stay high in the retailer’s country, even as trade costs
decline, because this situation induces the original firm to offer smaller quan-
tities to the retailer. Second, legalizing the possibility of PT does not lead to the actual existence of such trade in a principal-agent setup. Rather, the manufacturer takes actions to deter it. Finally, allowing PT actually reduces welfare in this model. All of these findings remain robust to the possibility of the originator establishing a retail subsidiary abroad. An important feature of our model is that retail prices fail to move together, despite the legality of PT. Thus, while PT may not exist in models of simple retail arbitrage, it is because prices move together, at least up to unit transport costs. Here, we present a theory in which retail PT is deterred and yet price differences remain, which is most consistent with available evidence about this phenomenon.

Our results contrast sharply with the prior literature, which finds that the welfare effect of parallel trade is ambiguous. The reason for this difference is that our model posits a lack of vertical control, which forces the manufacturer to offer contracts to the retailer that will not support parallel imports. Hence, our conclusion is that making PT legal is not beneficial in the absence of vertical control on the part of IPR owners.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up and solves the model if parallel trade is prohibited. Section 3 demonstrates the optimal policy under complete information, and Section 4 discusses the implications of incomplete information. Section 5 endogenizes the role of the retailer by allowing the manufacturer to set up its own retail subsidiary. Section 6 concludes.

2 The model

We consider a model with one manufacturer in the home country and one potential retailer in a foreign country. Inverse home demand is given by \( p = \alpha - q \) which is known by both firms; the manufacturer’s marginal production costs are equal to \( c \). The parameter \( \alpha \) measures the quality of the good produced by the manufacturer as it is perceived by consumers relative to a substitute good. In order to focus on the interaction between the manufacturer and the retailer, we do not model the substitute good. Instead, we assume
that the substitute good is produced under perfect competition and supplied elastically. In this sense, $\alpha$ measures the quality of the manufacturer’s good as compared to the best alternative. As in standard models of parallel trade, the foreign market is served by the retailer. We will explore the manufacturer’s optimal contract structure under both complete information and incomplete information. Incomplete information implies that the retailer has some private information about market conditions that is unknown to the manufacturer. In Section 5, we will also allow the manufacturer to choose to serve the foreign market directly via a wholly owned subsidiary. This will further endogenize the role of the retailer.

In the case of complete information, the foreign inverse demand function is given by $p^* = \beta - q^*$ where $\beta$ is similar to $\alpha$ in the manufacturer’s home country and is common knowledge. Under incomplete information, however, the manufacturer does not know the market potential $\beta$ in the foreign country, but the retailer does. A retailer of type $\beta$ will also face an inverse demand function $p^* = \beta - q^*$, but the parameter $\beta$ is private information of that firm. For our analysis in the following two sections, it does not matter whether $\beta$ is market-specific, making it a generic feature of demand conditions, or whether $\beta$ is firm-specific and measures the retailer’s capability of selling the manufacturer’s product as a high-quality good compared to the closest substitute in the foreign market. Our basic model can accommodate both setups, but when we allow the manufacturer to set up its own retail subsidiary, we have to be more specific on this. In what follows we will use the notion of $\beta$ being firm-specific when we refer to good (bad) firm types when $\beta$ is large (small). All the manufacturer knows is that retailers are distributed according to the uniform c.d.f. $F(\beta) = (\beta - b)/(B - b)$ with bounds $b$ and $B$ such that $B > b > c$ and $F(b) = 0$ and $F(B) = 1$. The special case of complete information occurs if $b = B$.

Achieving meaningful equilibrium possibilities in our setup requires certain conditions on the parameters. The first is

**Condition 1** $b > (B + c)/2$

This relationship guarantees that no type will be excluded from the con-
tract offer if parallel trade is illegal. Furthermore, we assume that both markets are potentially profitable, that is, $c < \min\{\alpha, b\}$.

The timing of the game is as follows: In the first stage, the manufacturer offers the retailer a set of contracts that specify a transfer $T$ from the retailer to the manufacturer and the level of exports $x$ from the manufacturer to the retailer.\(^2\) In the second stage, the retailer either rejects all contracts or agrees to one contract. In case of acceptance, the manufacturer delivers $x$ to the retailer. In the third stage, the manufacturer decides on his sales $y$. If parallel trade is allowed, the retailer decides on the level of sales in the two markets at the same time such that both firms potentially compete against each other in Cournot fashion in the domestic market.

In the remainder of this section, we will develop the optimal sales strategy of the manufacturer if parallel trade is prohibited. The case of complete information and banned PT is straightforward: the manufacturer makes the retailer one offer, which specifies the monopoly export level of $(\beta - c)/2$ in return for a transfer fee of $(\beta^2 - c^2)/4$. This offer makes the retailer just indifferent between acceptance and rejection, in which case we will assume that it will be accepted. The manufacturer is thus able to capture the aggregate maximum profits from both markets.

The case of incomplete information with prohibited PT is a standard principal-agent problem. Since the manufacturer cannot observe $\beta$, he will offer a set of contracts \(\{x(\beta), T(\beta)\}\), where $T$ is the transfer from the retailer to the manufacturer. Without parallel imports, the profit of a retailer of type $\beta$ pretending to be of type $\hat{\beta}$ is equal to\(^3\)

\[
\pi^*(\beta, \hat{\beta}) = [\beta - x(\hat{\beta})]x(\hat{\beta}) - T(\hat{\beta}).
\]  

The retailer can pretend to be of any type which is in the support of $\beta$. Appendix A.1 shows that the optimal set of contracts is given by

\(^2\)Note that it does not matter that contracts are offered as combinations of $x$ and $T$. They can easily be rewritten as contracts which specify a wholesale price $w = T/x$ and $x$. The elements that matter are that the transfer is sunk after the second stage and that $x$ restricts the retailer’s sales in both markets.

\(^3\)In what follows, we shall denote operating profits of the two firms by $\pi$ and $\pi^*$, respectively, and the aggregate profit of the manufacturer by $\Pi$.  

7
\[ x(\beta) = \frac{2\beta - B - c}{2}, \tag{2} \]
\[ T(\beta) = \lambda + \tau(\beta), \]
\[ \lambda = \frac{2b(b - B - c) - (B + c)^2}{4}, \]
\[ \tau(\beta) = \frac{\beta}{2}(2B - \beta + 2c). \]

The term \( \lambda \) denotes the optimal license fee, which is the fixed payment made by all types. It is derived such that the worst type’s operating profits are equal to the sum of its transfer payment and the production cost. The term \( \tau(\beta) \) denotes the variable license payment. This optimal set of contracts guarantees that (i) all types reveal their true efficiency and (ii) the highest-efficiency type gets the first-best output level. Condition 1 guarantees that all types will be included if the manufacturer’s outside option is not profitable. Figure 1 compares the optimal contracting under incomplete information (lower line) with the situation under complete information (upper line). Compared to the optimal contract structure under complete information, exports are smaller except for the most efficient firm type. The manufacturer reduces the amount of exports offered to worse types because this allows him to pay fewer rents to the good types.

Given the optimal contracting (2) without parallel imports, implying \( q = y \), the manufacturer will set \( y \) equal to \( (\alpha - c)/2 \) in his home market. The price in the foreign market is equal to

\[ p^* = \frac{B + c}{2} \]

and does not depend on \( \beta \). The constant price is a result of our uniform distribution, but note that foreign consumer surplus does depend on \( \beta \). The reason is that the level of exports varies with the firm type and the type itself contributes to expected foreign consumer surplus.

What happens if parallel trade is not prohibited? First, if PT occurs, the retailer has to carry an additional cost of engaging in that trade, which we denote by \( t \) per unit. Second, for parallel trade to occur in scheme (2) it must
be that price in the home market less the trade cost $t$ is larger than the price in the foreign market:

$$p - t > \frac{B + c}{2}.$$  

Given that the manufacturer is a monopolist in his home market without PT and his monopolistic output is equal to $(\alpha - c)/2$, this translates into

**Condition 2** $\alpha - B - 2t > 0$

which will hold for the case of positive parallel imports and which we label the parallel trade condition. Hence, we have a simple model in which the retailer, regardless of its type, would engage in PT if the set of optimal contracts under a parallel import ban were offered. Note that the condition for profitable PT also implies that $\alpha - c - 2t > 0$ because $B > c$. Furthermore, it also implies that the domestic market potential is larger in any case as $\alpha > B > b$ must hold. If the opposite were true PT would not occur as the foreign retailer would have no interest in the domestic market.
3 Parallel trade with an informed manufacturer

We now turn to the possibility of parallel trade in more detail. This section will deal with the case of an informed manufacturer. In this case, the manufacturer will offer just one contract, with which it is able to reap all operating profits from the retailer. Suppose that the contract has been accepted. In the last stage, the retailer plays a potential Cournot game against the manufacturer in the manufacturer’s home market. Let us denote all operating profits in the last stage by the lower case $\pi$, whereas the overall profits will continue to be denoted by the upper case $\Pi$. Suppose that the contract specifies exports $x$, and let $\pi^*(m,y)$ denote the retailer’s profits after having paid for $x$. Hence, $x$ is fixed but the level of PT, $m$, and the manufacturer’s output, $y$, are determined in a Cournot game, the details of which can be found in Appendix A.2.

The manufacturer may make an offer that it knows will not be accepted. It would want to do this if any acceptable offer would make the manufacturer worse off compared to serving the domestic market only, in which case profits are $(\alpha - c)^2/4$. Assume for the time being that $x = 0$ is not the best option. In this case, the manufacturer will always make an offer to the retailer such that the latter is just indifferent between acceptance and rejection. Thus, we can solve stage 1 such that the manufacturer will maximize the combined profit of its own activities and of the retailer over $x$, correctly anticipating potential PT. Let us denote aggregate profits by $\Pi$ and write $y$ and $m$ as functions of $x$. The manufacturer maximizes

$$\Pi = \pi[y(x), m(x), x] + \pi^*[y(x), m(x), x] - cx$$

over $x$, where we have taken into account the fact that exports imply production costs that are not taken into account by the retailer once it makes the contracted transfer payment.

The manufacturer has two options, either tolerating PT or reducing exports such that PT is not profitable at the margin. To deter parallel trade the best the manufacturer can do is to set the export level below $(\beta - c)/2$
such that

\[ x = \frac{2(\beta + t) - (\alpha + c)}{4}. \]  

Alternatively, the manufacturer maximizes \( \Pi \) w.r.t. \( x \), taking into account the level of parallel imports. This leads to an optimal export level

\[ x = \frac{4\alpha + 13\beta - 17c - 36t}{26}. \]  

Note that expression (3) increases with \( t \) (and PT is deterred) while expression (4) decreases with \( t \) (and PT exist). Furthermore, both expressions coincide for \( t = 3(\alpha - c)/14 \). Therefore, PT will occur for low levels of \( t \) but not for high levels of \( t \) because the manufacturer restricts exports just enough to deter it. Once rising trade costs reach \((\alpha - c)/2\), parallel trade poses no threat for the manufacturer and he can sell the monopolistic output \((\beta - c)/2\) to the retailer. We summarize these findings in

**Lemma 1** If the optimal contract warrants \( x > 0 \), the manufacturer will allow parallel trade for low levels of trade costs but deter it for high levels of trade costs. Exports to the retailer decrease (increase) with trade costs if these exports imply (do not imply) positive PT.

One immediate implication of Lemma 1 is that both the manufacturer and the consumers in the foreign country are made worse off by economic integration, measured by a decline in trade costs, when trade costs are large to start with. Expression (3) shows that a decline in \( t \) reduces manufacturer exports below the monopolistic level. The reason is that the manufacturer still wants to deter parallel trade and economic integration makes PT more profitable.

As for low trade costs, the equilibrium levels of the manufacturer’s production for his home market, \( y \), parallel imports, \( m \), and the aggregate output in the home and the foreign market, \( q \) and \( q^* \), are respectively given by
Thus, where trade costs are low both home and foreign consumers benefit from economic integration because both $q$ and $q^*$ expand as $t$ falls.

We also find that the manufacturer’s profit is non-monotonic as demonstrated by Figure 2 (see Appendix A.2). Figure 2 shows that reduced trade costs increase (decrease) the manufacturer’s profits in the case of positive PT if trade costs are small (moderate) to start with. A decrease in $t$ increases aggregate profits when $t$ is small (Region I) because one rival in this Cournot duopoly becomes more efficient, thus raising aggregate profits. If $t$ is large,
the manufacturer’s domestic profits stay unchanged but it must reduce exports to the retailer as $t$ falls in order to maintain its monopoly position in the domestic market (Region III). We see that its profits are maximal when trade cost achieve or exceed $t = (\alpha - c)/2$, removing any threat from parallel imports. Figure 2 also demonstrates that optimal exports may equal zero for an intermediate range of trade costs if $\beta$ is small. Assume that home monopoly profits $(\alpha - c)^2/2$ are given by the horizontal line. The manufacturer would want to export only in Region I and in Region III, that is when trade costs are sufficiently small or sufficiently large. This line moves closer to maximum profits $((\alpha - c)^2 + (\beta - c)^2)/4$ with a reduction in $\beta$, which clearly demonstrates that Region I may not exist and exports would occur only in the case of sufficiently large trade costs (see Appendix A.2 for the formal details).

The non-monotonicity of manufacturer’s profits and foreign consumer surplus can also be found in models with vertical control. The main difference is that in those models the manufacturer controls the retailer’s activities via a wholesale price, which is the marginal cost of the latter. Without vertical control, any transfer from the retailer to the manufacturer is sunk and the manufacturer can only restrict the level of exports to the retailer. It cannot affect the relative profitability of the two markets.

4 Parallel trade with an uninformed manufacturer

We now turn to the case in which the manufacturer does not know the retailer’s type. This is by no means a simple extension of the case without parallel trade. In particular, the manufacturer may be able to learn the type of the retailer. This is an important difference because the manufacturer will determine its output for the domestic market after potential acceptance of a contract by the retailer. If this acceptance reveals the retailer’s type, the manufacturer’s output decision will depend on this signal. If PT is illegal, the retailer’s type would also be learned but this has no effect on the manufacturer’s behavior. However, with legalized PT we must take into account the
fact that the manufacturer will potentially use the retailer’s signal to update its beliefs consistently. Consistency requires that the beliefs of the manufacturer are confirmed in equilibrium, and thus we now explore the possibility of a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

We will focus first on the existence of separating equilibria. In this case, the manufacturer offers a separate contract for each retailer type and consequently updates its beliefs under the assumption that a contract designed for type $\beta$ will be picked by type $\beta$ only. This has a strong implication as is demonstrated by

**Proposition 1** If parallel trade is legal, there is no separating equilibrium with positive parallel trade volumes.

Proof: See Appendix A.3.

The proof of Proposition 1 is tedious and lengthy and thus relegated to the appendix. The intuition, however, is straightforward. As before in the case without parallel trade, the manufacturer wants a good type to reveal that it is, in fact, efficient, which means that this good retailer receives a larger $x$ than would worse types. Without PT, the manufacturer accomplishes this by offering a higher rent and a larger $x$ to the better types. When parallel trade is permitted, however, there is an additional incentive: if a retailer signals that it is a good type, the manufacturer will learn that and thus decide on a large $y$ because it knows (and the retailer knows that it knows, and so on) that the foreign market is more profitable than the domestic market for the retailer. Therefore, the retailer has an additional incentive to pretend to be a worse type than it actually is in order to make its sales in the domestic country more profitable. In the end, there is no incentive scheme in which both opposing effects can be reconciled, and the retailer would always want to conceal its type if the manufacturer tries to learn it.

Proposition 1 is a central result of our analysis. It stands in contrast with the case of complete information in which PT will occur for low trade costs unless the foreign market potential is too small. This result of positive PT fails to survive even the smallest increase in uncertainty about the retailer’s type. Proposition 1 does not claim that no separating equilibrium exists in
general, but only that none exists which involves positive PT. Hence, we now explore whether a separating equilibrium without PT exists. Proposition 2 has the answer to this existence question.

**Proposition 2** If parallel trade is legal and \( b \) is sufficiently large, a fully separating equilibrium with zero PT volumes exists. If \( b \) is sufficiently small, offers will be accepted by sufficiently good types only.

Proof: See Appendix A.4.

Appendix A.4 finds that if \( b > 2(B+c)/3-(\alpha+c-2t)/6 \) the manufacturer prefers not to discriminate against bad types but to include all types. It also shows that the optimal contract of the manufacturer implies

\[
x(\beta) = \frac{\beta - \alpha + c - 2t}{2}, \\
T(\beta) = \lambda + \tau(\beta), \\
\lambda = \frac{4b(b - (\alpha + c - 2t)) - (\alpha + c - 2t)^2}{16}, \\
\tau(\beta) = \frac{\alpha + c - 2t}{4} \beta.
\] 

Note that exports are equal to expression (3), which gave the optimal export level under complete information where trade costs are high.

Why does a separating equilibrium exist if parallel trade does not occur? The reason is that the manufacturer also learns the retailer’s type in this case but his output decision for the home market is unaffected by this Bayesian update. Without PT, \( y = (\alpha - c)/2 \) irrespective of the retailer’s type. In turn, the retailer has no reason to conceal its type as it will not sell in the domestic market anyway.

If there is only a separating equilibrium without PT, can there be a pooling equilibrium? If the answer is yes, will it possibly imply positive parallel trade? We find that

**Proposition 3** If parallel trade is legal, there is no pooling equilibrium.

Proof: See Appendix A.5.
The intuition for this result is as follows. First, consider a candidate pooling equilibrium with potential discrimination against bad types in which the manufacturer offers just one contract \( \{x, T\} \). The operating profits of the retailer unambiguously increase with \( \beta \), and this is the reason why bad types could be excluded. Consequently, it may happen that all types \( \beta \in [b, \beta'] \) will reject and all types \( \beta \in [\beta', B] \) will accept the contract. Second, suppose that \( x = x(\beta') \) follows (6), which implies that PT will not occur: all worse types who would potentially sell in the domestic market will not accept and all better types have no incentive to sell in the domestic market. We show in Appendix A.5 that the manufacturer cannot improve on its profits by increasing exports, for this would imply that some types start selling in the home market. The reason is that the increase in the expected operating profits of type \( \beta' \) falls short of the the decline in the manufacturer’s profits in its market. Thus, any pooling equilibrium would imply no parallel imports. Furthermore, the manufacturer can do better than offering just one contract \( \{x, T\} \). Instead, it is better by following (6). Since \( T(\beta) \) in (6) increases with \( \beta \), expected transfers will be unambiguously larger, which completes the proof.

An immediate implication is that the separating equilibrium with zero PT volumes is the only possible equilibrium. Strategy (6) is thus the best the manufacturer can do. Note carefully that, although both \( x(\beta) \) and \( \tau(\beta) \) increase with \( \beta \) and the worst type \( b \) does not receive a rent, it is not true that the best retailer receives the first-best exports:

\[
x(B) = \frac{B}{2} - \frac{\alpha + c - 2t}{4} < \frac{B - c}{2}
\]

because \( \alpha - c - 2t > 0 \). In general, \( x(\beta) \) according to (6) is smaller than \( x(\beta) \) according to (2), which leads to

**Proposition 4** Legalizing parallel trade makes both the manufacturer and foreign consumers worse off under incomplete information.

Proof: It is sufficient to prove that the outputs for each type are smaller for (6) compared to (2) because (2) falls short of the monopolistic outcome:
\[\frac{2\beta - B - c}{2} > \frac{\beta - \alpha + c - 2t}{4} \Leftrightarrow \alpha - c + 2t + 2\beta - 2B > 2\beta - (\alpha + c - 2t) > 0\]

because \(B < \alpha - 2t\) (see Condition 2) and \(\beta > b > (\alpha + c - 2t)/2\) (see Condition 1). \(\square\)

Scheme (6) is determined such that each retailer truthfully reports its type and is just indifferent between selling and not selling in the domestic market. If competition policy required that the manufacturer must offer only a single contract, only a pooling equilibrium would be possible. From our discussion of Proposition 3, however, we know that this would also imply zero parallel trade volumes. Hence, the irony is that permitting PT will make it not happen.

One might think that the problem could be overcome if the manufacturer and the retailer, rather than forming a partnership only once as in this model, contract for a longer period in a repeated game. Unfortunately, repetition does not solve this problem because it is well known from the ratchet effect (see Laffont and Tirole [7]) that a separating equilibrium cannot exist under incomplete information. This would be true in our model, even if PT is not permitted. The reason is that the manufacturer would learn the retailer’s type in an early period and would leave the retailer without a rent in the next period. Hence, for a similar reason as in our static model, the retailer would always have an incentive to conceal its type when the manufacturer strives to learn it.

5 Discussion and extension

We now discuss the properties of the equilibrium contract structure and also consider how our results change when we allow the manufacturer to set up its own retail subsidiary.
5.1 The effect of economic integration and retailer heterogeneity

In this subsection, we consider the effect of economic integration, measured by a decline in $t$, and of an increase in the manufacturer’s uncertainty on the retailers’s type. We explore the role of potential retailer heterogeneity by a mean-preserving spread: the uniform distribution is spread out such that $dB = -db > 0$, which guarantees that the mean $(B + b)/2$ stays constant. To preview the outcome, if PT is prohibited then variations in $t$ have no impact, but an increase in retailer heterogeneity does affect the results.

Proposition 5 If parallel trade is prohibited, an increase in retailer heterogeneity reduces both the expected exporting profits of the manufacturer and foreign consumer surplus.

Proof: See Appendix A.6.

Both the expected consumer surplus and the expected export profits are harmed by a mean-preserving spread. The reason is that such a spread increases the rent for the good retailer types. This is partially compensated for by reducing exports to the bad types, but both effects reduce the manufacturer’s expected export profits. Foreign consumers are harmed by a mean-preserving spread because exports to good types will not change much but exports to bad types will be reduced. Indeed, expected exports $\int_b^B x(\beta)d\beta/(B - b)$ are equal to $(b - c)/2$ and depend on the worst type only. Therefore, a mean-preserving spread, reducing $b$, will unambiguously reduce expected exports and harm foreign consumers.

Consider next the situation in which PT is allowed, though we know from earlier analysis that such trade will not occur in equilibrium. In this case the manufacturer’s domestic market remains completely unaffected by changes in the foreign market. Hence, we need to consider the foreign market only.

Proposition 6 Suppose PT is legal. A mean-preserving spread increases expected foreign consumer surplus and decreases the expected export profits of the manufacturer. Economic integration decreases both expected foreign consumer surplus and the expected export profits of the manufacturer.
Proof: See Appendix A.6.

The effect of economic integration is straightforward. As the whole scheme makes each retailer type indifferent between selling in the domestic market or not, a decline in trade costs implies that the manufacturer’s exports have to be reduced. This reduces both that firm’s expected export profits and the expected foreign consumer surplus. As in Proposition 5, the manufacturer suffers from an increase in heterogeneity but for a different reason. The manufacturer gets more profit from better types in terms of variable transfers $\tau$ minus costs, but this will be exactly offset by the lesser profit it gets from the worse types. The license fee $\lambda$, however, is designed such that the worst type does not get a rent, and a mean-preserving spread will reduce the operating profits of the worst type. Therefore, only the negative effect on the fixed license fee counts for the manufacturer.

Contrary to Proposition 5, Proposition 6 shows that a mean-preserving spread increases expected foreign consumer surplus. The reason is that a mean-preserving spread leaves the mean of $x(\beta)$ now unchanged, but since consumer surplus is quadratic in outputs, the reduction at the low end is more than compensated by the increase at the high end of retailer types. Foreign consumers will therefore appreciate an increase in retailer heterogeneity ex ante, although the level of exports will still fall short of the monopolistic output level.

5.2 Outside option of the manufacturer

All results so far have been developed under the assumption that the manufacturer does not have an outside option. We now explore the implications if the manufacturer may also set up a retail subsidiary in the foreign country. We assume an extra fixed greenfield cost, $G$, must be paid to establish this affiliate. However, the retailer as an incumbent firm does not have to carry this investment. The manufacturer may now decide to offer contracts only to sufficiently high-quality retailers, whereas it would prefer establishing a subsidiary rather than employing bad types. It can do so by not making type $b$, but rather another type $\tilde{\beta}$ with $\tilde{\beta} \in [b, B]$ indifferent between accepting
and rejecting its offer.\textsuperscript{4} As a result, all types worse than this new cutoff will reject the offer.

For this exercise, it is important whether $\beta$ is market-specific or firm-specific. Suppose that offers have been made that will be accepted by types for which $\beta \in [\tilde{\beta}, B]$ and rejected by types for which $\beta \in [b, \tilde{\beta}]$. If the retailer rejects all offers, the manufacturer learns that $\beta \in [b, \tilde{\beta}]$ if $\beta$ is market-specific. Accordingly, this should lead to a Bayesian update of beliefs about market conditions and the corresponding conditional greenfield profits. However, if $\beta$ is firm-specific, the manufacturer learns nothing except that the potential partner had low quality. In this case, it is fair to assume that the manufacturer will draw from the same basic distribution if it wants to make a greenfield investment, and thus no update of beliefs about market conditions should result from rejection by the retailer.

Accordingly, expected conditional greenfield (operating) profits are equal to

$$\hat{\pi}_g(\tilde{\beta}) = \int_b^\gamma \frac{(\beta - c)^2}{2} \frac{d\beta}{B - b}$$

where $\gamma = B$ if $\beta$ is firm-specific and $\gamma = \tilde{\beta}$ if $\beta$ is market-specific. Note that in the case of complete information, operating profits are identical and equal to $(\beta - c)^2/4$.\textsuperscript{5} The game played now is different both if PT is permitted and if it is banned. In the third stage, if the retailer rejects any offer, the manufacturer will choose to set up a foreign subsidiary. If this happens, the manufacturer will decide on sales at home and abroad (through the subsidiary) in the last stage. If $\hat{\pi}_g(\tilde{\beta})$ is larger than $G$, the manufacturer may discriminate against bad types and offer contracts to good types only. Note that $\hat{\pi}_g(\tilde{\beta}) > G$ is only a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for this outcome.

The case of complete information is the easiest to deal with. Since the manufacturer’s profits are convex in trade costs (see Figure 1), the following

\textsuperscript{4}Of course, $\tilde{\beta} = B$ is also an option, in which case greenfield investment becomes the dominant strategy. This case is trivial and thus not considered any further.

\textsuperscript{5}In the case of no parallel trade and complete information, the outside option is irrelevant as the profits it would procure are always smaller due to $G$. 

20
result is obvious.

**Corollary 1** *If the manufacturer's outside option is profitable and it knows the retailer's type, the manufacturer may not employ a retailer if trade costs are in an intermediate range.*

We now consider how the option of a subsidiary will affect the manufacturer's optimal contracting in the case of incomplete information. To this end, we assume that $\pi^g(b) > G$, which means that a greenfield investment is always profitable, regardless of the foreign market potential. Otherwise, we would have to take into account the possibility that the manufacturer might not want to make an investment once it learns the retailer type. While this might be an interesting option, its implications are straightforward and depend on $\pi^g(b)$.

The expected export profit of the manufacturer now has two components, both of which depend on $\tilde{\beta}$. If the retailer accepts, the game is similar to that played in Section 4. However, the manufacturer will get a higher license fee because it is now $\tilde{\beta}$ and not the worst type $b$ that is made indifferent between acceptance and rejection. While this effect enhances profits, acceptance is not guaranteed. The probability of acceptance is equal to $(B - \tilde{\beta})/(B - b)$, implying that the manufacturer will make a greenfield investment, because of a rejected offer, with probability $(\tilde{\beta} - b)/(B - b)$.

With this setup, if an interior solution exists, a reduction in trade cost has an unambiguous effect on both the cutoff level $\tilde{\beta}$ and the manufacturer's expected export profit, as noted next.

**Proposition 7** *If the manufacturer has a profitable outside option and discriminates against bad retailer types, economic integration will lead to more discrimination and to a lower expected export profit.*

Proof: See Appendix A.7.

The intuition for this result is obvious. As shown by Proposition 6, economic integration makes the manufacturer export less to the retailer and thus reduces export profits. Therefore, its own retail investment becomes
relatively more profitable and, as a result, the manufacturer will be more selective and require retailers to be of a better type.

However, with this outside option of the manufacturer, there is little we can say about the effect of economic integration on foreign consumer surplus. While we know from Proposition 6 that lower trade costs harm foreign consumers without the subsidiary retailer option, this effect now becomes ambiguous and depends on the type of information revelation. For example, if $\beta$ is firm-specific and learned before output decisions have to be made, an increase in the cutoff level $\tilde{\beta}$ will partially benefit foreign consumers because there is now a greater likelihood of a larger (monopolistic) output. Similar ambiguous effects exist for a mean-preserving spread, and a detailed analysis would require the model to be more specific about the outside option. In any case, however, PT still would not occur, even in an equilibrium that is only separating among good types.

6 Concluding remarks

This paper explored how incomplete information affects the optimal contracting of a manufacturer dealing with a retailer of unknown quality. We found that parallel trade may occur in a setup of complete information. However, if information is incomplete and asymmetric – as we might expect where the manufacturer chooses to employ a foreign retailer – PT will not occur even if permitted. The reason is that any set of contracts that might achieve separation among types must deal with two conflicting interests: the need of the manufacturer to learn the type of the retailer, and the desire of the retailer to conceal its type in order to increase profits in the manufacturer’s market. We found that no set of contracts exists that can reconcile both demands. Rather, there is only a set that rules out parallel trade. The sobering news, therefore, for those in favor of permitting PT is that it will not occur in this environment.

To provide further practical content to this outcome, consider, for example, the EU’s policy of rigorous and open PT within the internal market. This regime is supported as a means to achieve pro-competitive gains and
reduce prices facing consumers. However, in the circumstances analyzed here, an open PT policy actually has the effect of reducing supplies offered to the retailers’ market, tending to raise consumer prices, while having no offsetting impacts on consumer prices in the manufacturer’s market. Put differently, we still observe the standard arbitrage-based result that prices rise in markets from which PT would originate (in this case the retailer’s market), though it is due to reduced competition there rather than actual outward trade flows. However, we do not observe the price-diminishing impact of PT inflows in the manufacturer’s market. In brief, legalized PT in this environment is anti-consumer.

Appendix

A.1 Optimal contracting without parallel trade

Any contract scheme has to make sure that a type $\beta'$ prefers a contract designed for its type and not for any other type, say type $\beta''$. Hence, we require that $\pi^*(\beta', \beta') \geq \pi^*(\beta', \beta'')$ and $\pi^*(\beta'', \beta'') \geq \pi^*(\beta'', \beta')$. Adding up both conditions yields

$$(\beta' - \beta'')(x(\beta') - x(\beta'')) \geq 0 \quad (A.1)$$

which implies that the export level should not declines with $\beta$. Using the tools of principal-agent theory, we can determine the optimal set of contracts by maximizing the virtual surplus of the manufacturer, that is

$$\int_b^B \{[\beta - x(\beta) - c]x(\beta) - \frac{1 - F(\beta)}{f(\beta)}x(\beta)\}dF(\beta) \quad (A.2)$$

w.r.t. $x(\beta)$. The last term captures the rent to be paid to more productive firms as to guarantee incentive compatibility. Maximization of (A.2) w.r.t. $x(\beta)$ leads to (2). Furthermore, $x(\beta)$ increases with $\beta$ as requested by condition (A.1). The manufacturer also has no interest in discriminating against worse types such that only good types will accept but all others will reject. Suppose the manufacturer did, and let $\bar{\beta}$ denote the type which is just indifferent between acceptance and rejection. The expected export profit would be equal to

$$\int_\beta^B \left( \frac{\beta}{2}(2B - \beta + 2c) - c \frac{2\beta - B - c}{2} \right) \frac{d\beta}{B - b}$$
and its first derivative w.r.t. $\bar{\beta}$ for $\bar{\beta} = b$ is

$$\frac{- (2b - (B + c)^2)}{B - b} < 0$$

which proves that discrimination against some (bad) types would reduce expected export profits.

### A.2 Equilibrium under complete information

The retailer maximizes its profits

$$\pi^*(m, y) = (\alpha - (m + y) - t)m + (\beta - (x - m))(x - m) \text{ s.t. } 0 \leq m \leq x$$

over $m$. $t$ denotes the trade cost of parallel imports. Note that $T$ is irrelevant for the retailer’s decision at this stage. The marginal profits of the retailer are equal to

$$\frac{\partial \pi^*}{\partial m} = \alpha - \beta + 2x - y - 4m - t.$$

The manufacturer maximizes its profits

$$\pi(m, y) = (\alpha - (m + y) - c)y$$

over $y$ which yields the optimal production level for its home market

$$y = \frac{\alpha - c - m}{2}.$$

We now have to distinguish three cases: (i) the retailer does not want to serve its local market but the manufacturer’s market only ($m = x$); (ii) the retailer serves the local market only ($m = 0$); (iii) the retailer serves both markets ($0 < m < x$).

Case (i) is an equilibrium if the retailer’s marginal profits are non-negative for $m = x$:

$$\frac{\partial \pi^*(m = x)}{\partial m} = \alpha - \beta - 2x - y - t \geq 0.$$

The manufacturer’s sales will be equal to $y = (\alpha - c - x)/2$ which leads to

$$\frac{\partial \pi^*(m = x)}{\partial m} = \alpha - \beta - 2x - \frac{\alpha - c - x}{2} - t \geq 0$$

$$\Leftrightarrow x \leq \frac{(\alpha + c) - 2(\beta + t)}{3} \quad (A.3)$$
Case (ii) is an equilibrium if the retailer’s marginal profits are non-positive for $m = 0$:

$$\frac{\partial \pi^*(m = 0)}{\partial m} = \alpha - \beta + 2x - y - t \leq 0.$$  

The manufacturer’s sales will be equal to $y = (\alpha - c)/2$ (monopolistic output) which leads to

$$\frac{\partial \pi^*(m = x)}{\partial m} = \alpha - \beta + 2x - \frac{\alpha - c}{2} - t \leq 0 \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad x \leq \frac{2(\beta + t) - (\alpha + c)}{4} \quad (A.4)$$

Case (iii) gives the interior solutions and leads to

$$m = \frac{\alpha + c + 4x - 2(\beta + t)}{7}, \quad y = \frac{3\alpha + \beta + t - 2(x + 2c)}{7}. \quad (A.5)$$

Note that conditions (A.3) and (A.4) are mutually exclusive because $x \geq 0$. If

**Condition 3**

$$\beta > \frac{\alpha + c}{2}.$$  

holds there are two important implications. First, case (i) never materializes because $(\alpha + c) - 2(\beta + t)$ is negative due to $\beta > (\alpha + c)/2$, (but $m = 0$ may materialize). (Furthermore, it is easy to show that it can never be in the best interest of the manufacturer that $m = x$.) Second, $\beta < \alpha$ due to Condition 2 implies that $m = 0$ can be achieved for low trade costs only if $x$ is set below the profit-maximizing level $(\beta - c)/2$ which would be optimal if parallel imports were prohibited. Intuitively, $\beta < \alpha$ due to Condition 2 guarantees that the retailer’s market is not so profitable that the retailer will never engage in PT. Furthermore, Condition 3 guarantees the retailer’s market is not so unprofitable that the retailer would not want to serve it at all.

If the optimal contract warrants $x > 0$, the maximized manufacturer’s profit has a minimum at $t = (\alpha - c)/9 < 3(\alpha - c)/14$. If the manufacturer’s optimal contract implies positive parallel trade, profits are largest for $t = 0$. If the manufacturer’s optimal contract does not imply parallel trade, profits are largest for $t \geq (\alpha - c)/2$. Using (5) to rewrite aggregate profits $\Pi$ as a function of $t$ and differentiating yields

\[25\]
\[ \frac{d\Pi}{dt} \bigg|_{x>0} = -\frac{2(\alpha - c - 9t)}{13}, \quad \frac{d^2\Pi}{dt^2} \bigg|_{x>0} = \frac{18}{13} > 0 \quad (A.6) \]

and shows that the maximized manufacturer’s profit has a minimum at \( t = (\alpha - c)/9 < 3(\alpha - c)/14 \). For \( t \geq 3(\alpha - c)/14 \), the manufacturer will export to the retailer but parallel imports will not occur. In that case the change with trade costs is equal to

\[ \frac{d\Pi}{dt} \bigg|_{x=0} = -\frac{\alpha - c - 2t}{8}, \quad \frac{d^2\Pi}{dt^2} \bigg|_{x=0} = -\frac{1}{4} < 0, \quad (A.7) \]

Furthermore, profits are linear-quadratic in \( t \) for the case of parallel trade, and thus profits are symmetric around \( t = (\alpha - c)/9 \). Hence \( \Pi(t = 0) \big|_{x>0} = \Pi(t = 2(\alpha - c)/9) \big|_{x>0} \) but \( 2(\alpha - c)/9 > 3(\alpha - c)/14 \) such that \( \Pi(t = 0) \big|_{x>0} = \Pi(t = 3(\alpha - c)/14) \big|_{x>0} \).

Computing the manufacturer’s maximized profits when they are lowest yields

\[
\Pi(t = (\alpha - c)/9) = \frac{61\alpha^2 + 108\beta^2 + 169c^2 - 2c(61\alpha + 108\beta)}{432}
\]

which is larger than \( \Pi(x = 0) = (\alpha - c)^2/4 \) if

\[
\beta > (\alpha - c)\frac{1}{6} \sqrt{\frac{47}{3}} + c > \frac{\alpha + c}{2}. \quad (A.8)
\]

If condition (A.8) is fulfilled and thus \( \beta \) is not too small, any optimal contract will imply \( x > 0 \). If not, the optimal contract warrants \( x = 0 \) at least in the neighborhood of \( t = (\alpha - c)/9 \). Computing the manufacturer’s maximized profits for \( t = 0 \) and comparing them with \( \Pi(x = 0) \) yields

\[
\Pi(t = 0) > \Pi(x = 0) \iff \beta > (\alpha - c)\frac{1}{26} \sqrt{\frac{2191}{3}} + c > \frac{\alpha + c}{2}. \quad (A.9)
\]

and thus Condition 3 cannot guarantee that \( \Pi(x = 0) < \Pi(t = 0) \). Due to the symmetry of the manufacturer’s profits with parallel trade in this range and that the level of \( \Pi(t = 0) \) will be reached again at a level for which \( m = 0, \Pi(t = 0) < \Pi(x = 0) \) implies that exports become profitable only if \( m = 0 \).

As a result, the manufacturer will always export to the retailer if \( \beta \) is not too small. If \( \beta \) is too small, \( x = 0 \) is optimal either for an intermediate range of trade costs or for all small trade costs. If \( x = 0 \) is optimal for all small trade costs, parallel trade will not occur. If the foreign market potential is
too small, monopoly home profits \((\alpha - c)^2/4\) are larger than profits existing under parallel trade. This may even be true for \(t = 0\), and in this case, no parallel trade would happen.

### A.3 Proof of Proposition 1

We will do the proof by contradiction. Assume that a separating equilibrium with parallel imports exists. In this case, each retailer would pick the contract designed for it. Importantly, this choice will give the manufacturer an important piece of information: as the manufacturer decides on its output for the domestic market after the retailer has chosen a contract, the manufacturer will learn the exact type of the retailer. Hence, if a separating equilibrium exists, it supports two goals of the manufacturer: (i) design contracts such that the expected profits of the manufacturer are maximized by the offered set of contracts \(x(\beta), T(\beta)\), and (ii) learn from the contract choice the retailer’s true type in order to adjust home outputs.

Assume that a retailer of type \(\beta'\) accepts a contract which is designed for type \(\beta''\). In the case of positive PT this will lead to an import level of

\[
m(\beta', \beta'') = \frac{\alpha - \beta' + 2x(\beta'') - y(\beta'') - t}{4}
\]

which will prompt the manufacturer to chose an output level

\[
y(\beta'') = \frac{2(\alpha + \beta'') - 4x(\beta'') + 2t}{5}
\]

This will be correctly anticipated by the retailer, who will in turn know that its import level will thus be equal to

\[
m(\beta', \beta'') = \frac{3\alpha - 5\beta' - 2\beta'' + 14x(\beta'') + 4c - 7t}{20}
\]

We can now compute the retailer’s profits as a function of his true type \(\beta\) and his announced type \(\hat{\beta}\). For the case above, we have

\[
\pi^*(\beta', \beta'') = (\alpha - (m(\beta', \beta'') + y(\beta'')) - t)m(\beta', \beta'')
\]

\[
+ (\beta - (x(\beta'') - m(\beta', \beta'')))(x(\beta'') - m(\beta', \beta'')) - T(\beta'')
\]

A similar expression, denoted by \(\pi^*(\beta'', \beta')\) can be derived if the true type is \(\beta''\) and the announced type is \(\beta'\). If a separating equilibrium exists, it must fulfill that both \(\pi^*(\beta', \beta') - \pi^*(\beta', \beta'') \geq 0\) and \(\pi^*(\beta'', \beta'') - \pi^*(\beta'', \beta') \geq 0\), that is, true revelation must weakly dominate. Adding both conditions leads to condition

\[
\pi^*(\beta', \beta') - \pi^*(\beta', \beta'') + \pi^*(\beta'', \beta'') - \pi^*(\beta'', \beta') \geq 0
\]
\[(\beta' - \beta'')\beta' - 12(x(\beta') - x(\beta'')) \geq 0. \quad (A.11)\]

In the case of true revelation, \(\partial \pi^*(\beta, \hat{\beta} = \beta) / \partial \hat{\beta} = 0\), implying that the increase in rent with the type is given by

\[
\frac{d\pi^*(\beta, \hat{\beta} = \beta)}{d\beta} = \frac{\partial \pi^*(\beta, \hat{\beta} = \beta)}{\partial \beta} = \frac{y(\beta, x(\beta)) + 2x(\beta) + t + \beta - \alpha}{4}
\]

due to the envelope theorem. The manufacturer maximizes the virtual surplus

\[\int_b^B \{[\alpha - (y(\beta, x(\beta)) - m(\beta)) - c]y(\beta, x(\beta)) + [\alpha - (y(\beta, x(\beta)) - m(\beta)) - c - t]m(\beta) + [\beta - (x(\beta) - m(\beta)) - c](x(\beta) - m(\beta)) - \frac{1 - F(\beta)}{f(\beta)} \frac{y(\beta, x(\beta)) + 2x(\beta) + t + \beta - \alpha}{4}\} dF(\beta)\]

over \(x(\beta)\). The first derivative set equal to zero yields

\[x(\beta) = \frac{21B - 16\beta - 13c + 8\alpha - 16\beta}{10}\]

Putting this expression into condition (A.11), however, leads to \(-13(\beta' - \beta'')^2 < 0\) which contradicts the requirement that the first derivative of the virtual surplus leads to a truth-telling mechanism.

A.4 Proof of Proposition 2

Let us write the retailer’s profits as a function of its true type \(\beta\), its pretended type \(\hat{\beta}\) and its level of imports into the domestic country \(m\):

\[
\pi^*(\beta, \hat{\beta}, m) = \left(\frac{\alpha + c}{2} - m - t\right) m \quad (A.13)
\]

\[
+ \left(\beta - \left(\frac{\hat{\beta}}{2} - \frac{\alpha + c - 2t}{4} - m\right)\right) \left(\frac{\hat{\beta}}{2} - \frac{\alpha + c - 2t}{4} - m\right)
\]

\[- T(\hat{\beta})\]

Given the transfer and export scheme (6), the retailer’s profits consist of its operating profits in the domestic market, given that the manufacturer
behaves as if it were a monopolist, plus its operating profits in the foreign market, corrected by the transfers paid to the manufacturer. The retailer is free to sell in the foreign market and to mimic any type. The derivatives w.r.t. sales in the domestic country and the pretended type are respectively equal to

\[
\frac{\partial \pi^*_\beta(\beta, \hat{\beta}, m)}{\partial m} = (\hat{\beta} - \beta) - 4m \quad \text{and} \\
\frac{\partial \pi^*_\beta(\beta, \hat{\beta}, m)}{\partial \hat{\beta}} = \frac{\hat{\beta} - \beta}{2} + m.
\]

Note that \(\frac{\partial \pi^*_\beta(\cdot)}{\partial m} = -4, \frac{\partial \pi^*_\beta(\cdot)}{\partial \hat{\beta}} = -\frac{1}{2}, \frac{\partial^2 \pi^*_\beta(\cdot)}{\partial m \partial \hat{\beta}} = 1, \frac{\partial^2 \pi^*_\beta(\cdot)}{\partial m^2} - \frac{\partial^2 \pi^*_\beta(\cdot)}{\partial \hat{\beta}^2} = 1 > 0.

Thus, the sufficient conditions are fulfilled and (A.14) implies true revelation with no sales in the domestic country, that is \(\hat{\beta} = \beta\) and \(m = 0\). Now assume that the manufacturer decides to discriminate against all types worse than \(\bar{\beta}\) such that only better types will accept a contract. This will lead to a larger license fee, but at the risk that the contract may not be accepted. Accordingly, the expected export profit is equal to

\[
\pi^x = \frac{B - \bar{\beta}}{B - b} \left( 4\bar{\beta}(\bar{\beta} - (\alpha + c - 2t)) - (\alpha + c - 2t)^2 \right)
\]

\[
+ \int_B^{\bar{\beta}} \left( \frac{(\alpha + c - 2t)\beta}{4} - c \left( \frac{\beta}{2} - \frac{\alpha + c - 2t}{4} \right) \right) \frac{d\beta}{B - b}.
\]

The first term is the probability of acceptance times the license fee designed such that type \(\bar{\beta}\) is indifferent between acceptance and rejection. The second term is similar to (A.22) below, except that it includes only the types that will accept. Assuming an interior solution, maximization w.r.t. \(\bar{\beta}\) yields an optimal cutoff level

\[
\bar{\beta} = \frac{2(B + c)}{3} - \frac{\alpha + c - 2t}{6}
\]

Thus, if \(b\) is not too small but \(b > \bar{\beta}\), the manufacturer will include all types.

### A.5 Proof of Proposition 3

If the manufacturer offers all retailers a single contract \([x, T]\) that may imply parallel trade, there will be three subsets of retailers: (i) those who will not
accept; (ii) those who will accept and will sell in the manufacturer’s market
(iii) and those who will accept and will not sell in the manufacturer’s market. Clearly, the manufacturer can figure out which types will do what. It is also clear that better types will accept, and among the better types the best will not sell in the manufacturer’s market. Since the manufacturer learns only about acceptance, he has to form expectations about the level of imports he may face. Accordingly, he will expect all types \( \beta \in [\beta', \beta''] \) to accept and sell in his market and all types \( \beta \in [\beta'', B] \) to accept as well, but not to sell in his market, where

\[
\pi^*(\beta', m') = T, \beta'' = \alpha + 2x - y - t,
\]

\[
m' = \arg\max_m ((\alpha - (m + y) - t)m + (\beta' - (x - m))(x - m))
= \frac{\alpha - \beta' + 2x - y - t}{4}.
\]

Note that

\[
\frac{dm'}{dx} = \frac{1}{2} \Leftrightarrow \frac{dx}{dm'} = 2.
\]

If the manufacturer allows parallel trade, that is \( \beta' < \beta'' \), he expects parallel imports of size

\[
\hat{m} = \int_{\beta'}^{\beta''} \frac{\alpha - \beta + 2x - y - t}{4(B - \beta')} = \frac{2m'^2}{B - \beta'}.
\]  

(A.17)

Note that this expectation is conditional upon acceptance, and this is the reason why the integral expression of the uniform distribution runs now from \( \beta' \) to \( B \). If parallel trade is possible, the manufacturer will now maximize

\[
\pi = (\alpha - (\hat{m} + y) - c)y
\]

in the second stage, leading to an optimal output of \( y = (\alpha - \hat{m} - c)/2 \) and thus \( dy/d\hat{m} = -1/2 \). If parallel trade will not occur because \( \beta' = \beta'' \), \( \hat{m} = 0 \). If the manufacturer offers only one contract that is accepted by type \( \beta' \), his overall payoff is equal to

\[
\pi + \pi^*(\beta', m') - cx \equiv V(m'),
\]  

(A.18)

that is, its profits in the home market, which is the transfer that makes type \( \beta' \) indifferent between acceptance and rejection, corrected for the costs of exports. Expression (A.18) can be read as a function of \( m' \), and we can now ask whether the manufacturer can be better off by allowing parallel trade.
We observe from (A.17) that we can treat allowing parallel trade as allowing \( m' \) to become strictly positive. Differentiation of expression (A.18) w.r.t. \( m' \) yields

\[
\frac{dV}{dm'} = \frac{\partial \pi^*}{\partial y} \frac{dy}{dm'} + \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial m'} - c \frac{dx}{dm'}
\]

(A.19)

\[
= \frac{2m'^2}{B - \beta'} - y - 2c
\]

\[
= \frac{\alpha + 3c - 3\hat{m}}{2}
\]

This term is clearly negative for \( m' = 0 \), which implies \( \hat{m} = 0 \). Furthermore, the second derivative \( \frac{d^2V}{dm'^2} = (3/2)\hat{m}/dm' > 0 \) shows that \( V \) is convex in \( m' \), and thus the manufacturer cannot improve on its overall payoff by allowing parallel trade for any \( \beta' \). Any single contract will deter parallel trade, but the manufacturer can do even better by offering incentive-compatible contracts to all types \( \beta \in [\beta', B] \) according to (6).

### A.6 Mean-preserving spread

If parallel trade is prohibited, expected consumer surplus, denoted by \( \hat{CS}^* \), is equal to

\[
\hat{CS}^* = \int_b^B \frac{x(\beta)^2}{2} \frac{d\beta}{B-b} = \frac{(B-b)^2 + 3(b-c)^2}{24}
\]

(A.20)

The situation of complete information is a special case for which \( B = b \), yielding an expected consumer surplus of \( (b-c)^2/8 \). Expected export profits of the manufacturer, denoted by the superscript \( x \), are equal to

\[
\hat{\pi}^x = \frac{B^2 + 4b^2 + 3c^2 - 2b(B+3c)}{12}
\]

(A.21)

which boil down to the monopoly profits if \( B = b \). Differentiating (A.20) and (A.21) w.r.t. \( B \) and \( b \), respectively, yields

\[
\frac{\partial \hat{CS}^*}{\partial B} - \frac{\partial \hat{CS}^*}{\partial b} = \frac{2B - 5b + 3c}{12} < -\frac{B - c}{24} < 0
\]

and

\[
\frac{\partial \hat{\pi}^x}{\partial B} - \frac{\partial \hat{\pi}^x}{\partial b} = \frac{2B - 5b + 3c}{6} < -\frac{B - c}{12} < 0
\]

because \( b > (B+c)/2 \) (see Condition 1).
Expected export profits and the expected foreign consumer surplus, if parallel trade is permitted, are respectively given by

\[
\hat{\pi}^x = \frac{4b(b - (\alpha + c - 2t)) - (\alpha + c - 2t)^2}{16} + \int_b^B \left( \frac{(\alpha + c - 2t)\beta}{4} - c \left( \frac{\beta}{2} - \frac{\alpha + c - 2t}{4} \right) \right) \frac{d\beta}{B - b}
\]

and

\[
\hat{CS}^\ast = \int_b^B \frac{x(\beta)^2}{2} \frac{d\beta}{B - b} = \frac{4(b^2 + bB + B^2) - 6(b + B)(\alpha + c - 2t) + 3(\alpha + c - 2t)^2}{96}.
\]

We find that

\[
\frac{\partial \hat{\pi}^x}{\partial B} - \frac{\partial \hat{\pi}^x}{\partial b} = \frac{-2b - (\alpha + c - 2t)}{4} < 0,
\]

\[
\frac{\partial \hat{\pi}^x}{\partial t} = -\frac{B - b - \alpha + c + 2t}{4} > 0
\]

because Condition 2 implies that \( B - b - \alpha + c + 2t < -(b - c) \).

\[
\frac{\partial \hat{CS}^\ast}{\partial B} - \frac{\partial \hat{CS}^\ast}{\partial b} = \frac{B - b}{24} > 0,
\]

\[
\frac{\partial \hat{CS}^\ast}{\partial t} = \frac{B + b - (\alpha + c - 2t)}{8} > 0.
\]

**A.7 Outside option**

The expected export profit is equal to

\[
\hat{\pi}^x = \frac{\tilde{\beta} - b}{B - b} (\tilde{\pi}^g(\tilde{\beta}) - G) + \frac{B - \tilde{\beta}}{B - b} l(\tilde{\beta}) + \int_{\beta}^B (\tau(\beta) - cx(\beta)) \frac{d\beta}{B - b},
\]

\[
\lambda(\tilde{\beta}) = \frac{4\tilde{\beta}(\tilde{\beta} - (\alpha + c - 2t)) - (\alpha + c - 2t)^2}{16},
\]

32
where \( \lambda(\tilde{\beta}) \) follows from the condition that type \( \tilde{\beta} \)'s operating profits are equal to its transfers to the manufacturer plus the production cost. The license fee now depends positively on the cutoff \( \tilde{\beta} \); the variable transfers \( \tau(\beta) \) are not reported here but are the same as in (6). Note that (A.24) has the common denominator \( B - b \), and we therefore denote by \( \Psi \) the first derivative of (A.24) times \( (B - b) \) in what follows. It is not guaranteed that discrimination against bad types will occur, so assuming concavity w.r.t. \( \tilde{\beta} \), we can write the Kuhn-Tucker conditions as

\[
\Psi(\cdot) \equiv \hat{\pi}^g(\tilde{\beta}) - G + (\tilde{\beta} - b) \frac{\partial \hat{\pi}^g(\tilde{\beta})}{\partial \tilde{\beta}} - \lambda(\beta)
\]

\[
+ (B - \tilde{\beta}) \frac{\partial l(\beta)}{\partial \beta} - (\tau(\tilde{\beta}) - cx(\tilde{\beta})) \leq 0,
\]

\[\tilde{\beta} \geq b, \Psi(\tilde{\beta} - b) = 0.\]

Note that \( \partial \hat{\pi}^g(\tilde{\beta})/\partial \tilde{\beta} = 0 \) if \( \beta \) is firm-specific, that is if the manufacturer cannot draw any conclusion from rejection.

Given concavity, the change of \( \tilde{\beta} \) with \( t \) is determined by

\[
\frac{\partial^2 \Psi}{\partial \tilde{\beta} \partial t} = - \frac{\alpha - c + t - 2(B - \tilde{\beta})}{4} < 0
\]

because \( \alpha - c + t - 2(B - \tilde{\beta}) > 2\tilde{\beta} - (\alpha + c - 2t) > 0 \) due to Condition 2, \( \tilde{\beta} \geq b \) and Condition 1. Furthermore, due to the envelope theorem, expected export profits change with \( t \) according to

\[
\frac{d\pi^x}{dt} = \frac{\partial \pi^x}{\partial t} = - \frac{B - \tilde{\beta} - \alpha + c + 2t}{4} > 0
\]

because Condition 2 implies that \( B - \tilde{\beta} - \alpha + c + 2t < -(\tilde{\beta} - c) \).

References


