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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper Series: Finance & Accounting No. 117
Verlag: 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies a setting in which a risk averse agent must be motivated to work on two tasks: he (1) evaluates a new project and, if adopted, (2) manages it. While a performance measure which is informative of an agent´s action is typically valuable because it can be used to improve the risk sharing of the contract, this is not necessarily the case in this two-task setting. I provide a sufficient condition under which a performance measure that is informative of the second task is worthless for contracting despite the agent being risk averse. This shows that information content is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a performance measure to be valuable.
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