Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76756
Authors: 
Emons, Winand
Fluet, Claude
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, Universität Bern 08-05
Abstract: 
Two firms produce a product with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic. We call the vertical characteristic quality. The difference in the quality levels determines how the firms share the market. Firms know the quality levels, consumers do not. Under non-comparative advertising a firm may signal its own quality. Under comparative advertising firms may signal the quality differential. In both scenarios the firms may attempt to mislead at a cost. If firms advertise, in both scenarios equilibria are revealing. Under comparative advertising the firms never advertise together which they may do under non-comparative advertising.
Subjects: 
advertising
costly state falsification
signalling
JEL: 
D82
K41
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
313.65 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.